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Abstract 
Trends in police-recorded and (where they exist) household survey-measured cybercrimes for 
economic gain are reviewed in a range of developed countries – Australia, Canada, Germany, Hong 
Kong, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US - and their implications for criminal policy are 
considered. The datasets indicate a substantial rise in online fraud – though one that is lower than 
the ƌise iŶ oŶliŶe shoppiŶg aŶd otheƌ ͚ƌoutiŶe aĐtiǀitǇ͛ iŶdiĐators - but it is not obvious whether this 
is just displacement for the fall in household and automobile property crime, nor how much overlap 
theƌe is ďetǁeeŶ the offeŶdeƌs aŶd past ͚offliŶe͛ offeŶdeƌs.  Nor do the data indicate whether the 
frauds result from insiders or outsiders, or are collusive.  The direct and indirect costs of cyberfrauds 
are examined, and it is concluded that there is no satisfactory basis for the larger estimates of cost, 
but it is undeniable that those costs are large enough to merit concern.  There remains a problem of 
what metrics are appropriate for judging the threat and harm from cybercrimes, and their impact on 
national and human security.  There is not a sharp division between these larger national security 
issues and cyber attacks on banks, businesses, and the spear phishing of individuals with important 
knowledge of system vulnerabilities in the public or the private sector.  Rather there is a punctuated 
continuum in the interplay between private, corporate governmental and wider social risks.  
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Introduction 
WheŶ the late UlƌiĐh BeĐk ;ϭ99ϮͿ ĐoiŶed the teƌŵ ͚ƌisk soĐietǇ͛, his foĐus ǁas Ŷot oŶ the salieŶĐe of 
this concept to crime.  Since then, it appears that risks and threats to current and future processes in 
the ͚ĐǇďeƌ͛ ǁoƌld aƌe eǀeƌǇǁheƌe (as they are to other – usually mainly offline – crime arenas such as 
money laundering, transnational organised crime and, above all, terrorism). ͚Thƌeat assessŵeŶts͛ 
add to the ͚aǁaƌeŶess-ƌaisiŶg͛ pƌoĐess that is ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ ;alǁaǇs?Ϳ iŶsuffiĐieŶt to eliŵiŶate oƌ ƌeduĐe 
substantially our risks - both probabilities and impacts - of victimisation; action (pre and post-
victimisation) increases the profits of the cybersecurity businesses that have been spawned by the 
rise of e-commerce and social media. In this market characterised by diverse sources of assertion, 
information and ͚intelligence͛, it is difficult for most consumers, businesses, government 
oƌgaŶisatioŶs aŶd ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs to ǁoƌk out a ͚ƌatioŶal͛ ƌespoŶse; and there may be significant 
͚ŵaƌket failuƌe͛, as ǁhat analytical basis would the relatively or wholly inexpert have for assessing 
and purchasing these competing interpƌetatioŶs of ͚solutioŶs͛ to theiƌ ill-understood problems?  
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This is far from being a unique issue in criminology.  After all, academics have been discussing for 
decades the disparity between real victimisation rates and public beliefs about the incidence, 
prevalence and forms of particular crimes (like another heterogeneous category, ͚ǀioleŶt Đƌiŵe͛Ϳ.  
However, data availability in the sphere of both recorded and unreported cyber-related crimes has 
been poor, and suspicions about both the motivations and the accuracy of third party cybercrime 
data producers have surfaced periodically (see Anderson et al. (2012) for a review of cost of 
cybercrime data; and Levi and Burrows (2008) for an earlier review of the cost of fraud in the UK). 
Apart from country-specific surveys, the Eurobarometer delivers the only cross-national comparative 
data collection on fraud victimization in the EU (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_423_en.pdf.), showing clear variation in 
identity theft between countries. Although Williams (2016) provided some evidence that - when 
combined with individual level cyber security - national cyber security strategies have some 
measurable effect upon victimisation,2 both evidence of actual ƌisk aŶd kŶoǁledge of ͚ǁhat ǁoƌks͛ iŶ 
cybercrime reduction against individuals, business and governments are much in dispute.   
It has been alleged that the UK government was suppressing the rise in fraud and cybercrime, falsely 
claiming success in ͚Đƌiŵe ƌeduĐtioŶ͛ ǁheŶ iŶ faĐt theƌe ŵight siŵplǇ have been a displacement from 
better measured offline to ill-measured online crimes, whether committed for financial gain or (not 
dealt with in this article) of harassment and psychological gain for offenders/harm to victims (The 
Guardian, 2013; Fitzgerald, 2014).  It is also possible that a focus on cybercrime for financial gain – 
and indeed, on volume fraud generally – may shift focus away (a) from frauds committed by elites 
and others without the need for any special cyber-skills and/or (b) from frauds and commercial 
espionage by foreign organised or state-sponsored criminals.  Where cyber-attacks are aimed 
internationally, then using the individual nation state as the denominator of harm, risk or threat 
unintentionally breaks up the collective data-integration efforts and may reduce focus on some 
important attack vectors and prevention/pursuit opportunities. Nevertheless, historically, national 
victim-centric counting has been the focus for all forms of crime, and national data are considered 
below.   
There are other ways of looking at trends.  One – conventional in cybersecurity circles and in regular 
vendor and consultancy reports on risks – is to look at evolving techniques of cyber attacks and the 
͚thƌeat laŶdsĐapes͛: see, for example, the Europol iOCTA and ENISA reports.3  There are many such 
products and articles, which are important to prevention and to cybersecurity – indeed, business 
reporting of critical infrastructure cyberattacks is mandated by the 2013 European Directive on 
attacks against information systems, though such reports will be to bodies like CERTs and CISPs 
rather than to the police.  However, there is little added value in repeating these here, and because 
patterns and rates of change of victimisation (and sensational cases) tend to drive police and 
government crime policies, a more classical approach has been adopted in this article.  Note, 
however, that threats are comprised by the motives and capabilities of attackers, as well as 
                                                 
2 See further, http://cybersecurity.bsa.org/assets/PDFs/study_eucybersecurity_en.pdf.  
3 The author is a member of the Europol iOCTA and SOCTA advisory groups. 
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conscious and unselfconscious victim and third party defensive behaviour:  victim survey and 
reported crime data merely reflect the outĐoŵe of those ƌoutiŶe aĐtiǀitǇ ͚Đƌiŵe tƌiaŶgle͛ aĐtiǀities at 
a point in time. 
The primary focus of this article is on cybercrime for financial gain (cyberfraud) against individuals – 
discussed in greater detail in Levi et al. (2015) and by Levi et al. in this volume, but some of these are 
facilitated by intentionally (with insider help) or negligently caused data breaches involving business 
and government records.  There are now many national strategies and a large number of global, 
regional and national commercial victimisation surveys – mostly by vendors and financial advisory 
firms, but a few by governments – but there is no space to review these here (see Levi et al., 2015 
for a partial review, though new material emerges regularly).  Below are some relevant data from 
developed countries on trends in cyberfraud victimisation as far as they exist, using both official 
recorded data and victimisation surveys. Although these are not altogether comparable, it is hoped 
that these will be useful in considering the scale of some components of these problems in what 
ŵight ďe teƌŵed ͚huŵaŶ seĐuƌitǇ͛:  the ŶatioŶal seĐuƌitǇ aspeĐts of ĐǇďeƌfƌauds depend on how we 
construct that term, but negative events in trust, hacking and insider theft in commerce seep into 
national (in)security, making the distinction between national and human security overlap, in 
addition to the fact that national security is fundamentally about people who live in or are citizens of 
the nation. 
In those jurisdictions such as Germany where the financial losses to police-recorded crime are 
calculated, fraud greatly outstripped losses in other acquisitive crimes, but the breakdown of losses 
into cyber-enabled/other is not available. However, except where electronic communications and 
payments are not used at all, there is very little significant fraud that is not at least cyber-assisted in 
the late modern era, and routine administrative data collection is unlikely to preserve accurately the 
distinction between cyber-dependent, cyber-enabled, cyber-assisted, and entirely offline fraud. 
Trends in recorded and survey measured cyberfrauds 
 
The Eurobarometer (Eurostat, 2015) reports that in 2014, the proportion of Internet users 
experiencing online fraud (12% on average across the EU) is similar in most EU countries: the highest 
figure can be found in Poland (19%), and the lowest are Greece (4%) and Bulgaria (6%).  As for 
identity theft, on average across the EU, 7% of Internet users say they have experienced or been a 
victim. This figure is similar in most EU countries, although respondents in Hungary and Romania 
(11%) are more likely and those in Bulgaria and the Netherlands (both 3%) are least likely to be 
victims. The largest increases since 2013 can be found in Romania (up 6 percentage points) and 
France (up 5 points), while the largest decrease can be seen in Malta (down 6 points).  
The United Kingdom 
The response to these criticisms in England and Wales has been an acceleration of attempts by the 
Office of National Statistics (ONS) and by the Home Office to improve fraud and cybercrime 
statistics, adding them to both official crime statistics and crime surveys against individuals and 
businesses. (Though such changes are made warily, since they generate a massive rise in officially 
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recognised crime and a significant change in the time series of crime statistics, which has to be 
explained to a suspicious media and public often looking for political massage in data, even in 
changes which make ͚government effectiveness͛ look worse4: early iterations are therefore explicitly 
desĐƌiďed as ͚eǆpeƌiŵeŶtal statistiĐs͛, ON“, ϮϬϭϲa, ď).  
Findings from a 2015 field trial were refined into a revised crime survey, and the first wave of 
experimental statistics showed that in the year ending March 2016, adults aged 16 and over 
experienced an estimated 3.8 million incidents of fraud, with just over half of these being cyber-
related.5  The most common types of fraud experienced ǁeƌe ͞BaŶk aŶd Đƌedit aĐĐouŶt͟ fƌaud ;ϲϲ% 
of all incidentsͿ, folloǁed ďǇ ͞NoŶ-iŶǀestŵeŶt͟ fƌaud – such as fraud related to online shopping or 
fraudulent computer service calls (28% of incidents).  In addition, adults experienced an estimated 
2.0 million computer misuse incidents; around two-thirds of these were computer virus related and 
around one-third were related to unauthorised access to personal information (including hacking).  
Data show that 4.7 percent of adults were victims of payment card fraud, but do not provide any 
information on the number of times such frauds occurred or the scale of any loss that may have 
been experienced (ONS, 2016a).  The accompanying note on fraud generally (ONS, 2016b) 
illuminates with greater details and methodology, but I would add that though the Action Fraud 
reports include a variety of frauds (see ONS, 2016b and Levi et al. in this volume), neither they nor 
the household or commercial victimisation surveys have much to say about the sort of high 
seriousness cases dealt with in the UK by the Serious Fraud Office or the tax frauds handled by the 
Specialist Fraud Division of the Crown Prosecution Service, whose total financial value dwarfs the 
volume fraud cases discussed here. The cyber component in such cases has not been examined in 
detail but is usually present to some degree, as authorised financial transfers normally occur 
electronically.  Thus, while many major frauds generate false data electronically (such as the Madoff 
Ponzi scheme fictitious securities records showing investment profits), the ICT merely facilitates the 
scale of these crimes, especially where there are large numbers of victims.  
The crime survey data (ONS, 2016b) reveal that:     
 The large majority of victims of fraud had been a victim only once (84%), although repeat 
victimisation (within the same 12 month crime reference period) was more common among 
victims of bank and credit account fraud (14%) than among victims of other types of fraud. 
 Almost two-thirds of fraud incidents involved initial loss of money or goods to the victim 
(62%), independent of any reimbursement received. 
                                                 
4 The authoƌ ŵust deĐlaƌe aŶ iŶteƌest, as aŶ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ŵeŵďeƌ of the UK “tatistiĐs CoŵŵissioŶ͛s Cƌiŵe 
“tatistiĐs AdǀisoƌǇ Coŵŵittee, aŶd a ŵeŵďeƌ of Euƌopol͛s IŶteƌŶet-related Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment Advisory Group. 
5 Reyns (2013) connects BCS 2008/9 data on identity fraud to routine activity indicators, showing higher risk 
for high-income households and people active online. 
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  Victims received a full reimbursement in 43% of fraud incidents (1.6 million), typically from 
their financial provider. However, in 690,000 cases, the victim received no or only partial 
reimbursement. 
 Where money was taken or stolen from the victim, in just under two-thirds of incidents the 
victim lost less than £250 (64%). 
 Incidents of bank and credit account fraud were more likely than other types of fraud to 
result in initial loss to the victim (70%, equivalent to 1.7 million). The victim received a full 
reimbursement of their direct financial losses in 84% of cases.6 
 In 49% of non-investment frauds (such as fraud related to online shopping scams or 
fraudulent computer service calls) and 76% of all other frauds (for example, lottery scams, 
pyramid or Ponzi schemes or charity fraud) there was no loss to the victim. This compares to 
30% of incidents of bank and credit account fraud where no loss was suffered. 
 With regard to computer misuse, 22% of incidents involved loss of money or goods, all 
relating to computer viruses (442,000 incidents).  This would include malware extortion. 
Complete time series of all offences cannot be reconstructed. However, on-line frauds have risen 
over time, except for those affected by the introduction of Chip and PIN onto payment card 
transactions, which have fallen significantly in the UK and elsewhere, despite being displaced 
somewhat to the US where Chip and PIN have only recently and gradually been implemented (ECB, 
2015; FFA UK, 2016a).  These technological changes have in a sense reduced ICT-enabled frauds, 
namely the widespread copying of magnetic stripe data onto blank or other payment cards. Thus 
now, remote purchase frauds constitute 70% of all bank payment card fraud – almost doubling since 
2011 to £398.2 million in 2015, with a further 7% being identity frauds; remote banking fraud has 
more than doubled since 2011, now totalling £168.6 million (FFAUK, 2016b).  It is unwise and 
incorrect to demarcate hermetically online from offline crimes: combined email and telephone-
based social engineering methods have become very common in inducing people to transfer funds 
to fraudsters, sometimes inducing victims to deliver large sums in cash to couriers who call at their 
homes.7 
The proportion of Action Fraud cases that are cyber-enabled is unknown, but reports from the public 
to Action Fraud were affected by the disruption caused by the financial failure of the previous call 
centre.  Most of the iŶĐƌease iŶ ͞ďaŶkiŶg aŶd Đƌedit iŶdustƌǇ fƌaud͟ is thought to haǀe ƌesulted fƌoŵ 
                                                 
6 This is a somewhat contentious area, as alleged victim negligence (for example in writing down their PIN or 
giving it to someone else for convenience) can be a reason for refusal of reimbursement which is defended by 
the banks but resented by cardholders and contested by some academic critics of bank processes. 
7 This has been the subject of several radio consumer programmes and City of London police warnings. To 
include the telephone in an aggregated count of ICT may be unhelpful: the fraudsters may have used VOIP 
(Voice Over Internet Protocol) to reduce criminal running costs and traceability. But it is harder to disguise sex, 
age and ethnicity if there is human communication compared with email and text.    
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an increase in the volume of reported identity frauds in account applications (for example, applying 
to open a payment card account using a false identity). Since most of these are opened online, these 
are cyber-enabled or at least cyber-assisted.   
Scotland is a separate jurisdiction and has many separate criminal offences.  It is currently (June 
2016) considering the measurement improvements in England and Wales, but the most recent data 
available are from 2014/15. 5% of adults had experienced card fraud in the 12 months prior to 
interview (an average of 1.4 times), up from 4% the previous year. In both years, 1% of adults had 
been victims of identity theft, where someone had pretended to be them or used their personal 
details fraudulently (Scottish Government, 2014, 2016).  Though the report does not make this 
point, this would make fraud the most common type of acquisitive crime in Scotland, as well as 
being a prime cause of anxiety about crime. In 2014/5, the crimes that the largest proportion of 
Scots adults were worried or very worried about were that someone would use their credit card or 
bank details for fraud (54%) or that their identity would be stolen (45%); and these were also the 
offences that they thought were most likely to happen to them in the next year (17% and 11% 
respectively).   
There have been cybercrime reduction efforts and a national resilience strategy in Scotland 
(discussed in another article in this volume and http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/11/2023/3).  
Police-recorded crimes there show that in the period 2005-15, over 220 cases of unauthorised 
access and (or) causing damage/impairment to a computer/network were recorded by the police in 
Scotland. Where reported to the police, crimes identified as cyber-enabled will be recorded under 
the specific offence code for the registered crime (for example fraud, including online banking fraud 
and mass marketing fraud, and thefts such as using technology to steal personal data). Whilst the 
legacy force data did not record the use of a computer to perpetrate these crimes in a searchable 
foƌŵat, PoliĐe “ĐotlaŶd͛s IT sǇsteŵ (and that in the rest of the UK) aims to include a ͚ĐǇďeƌĐƌiŵe͛ 
marker that will be able to provide a more accurate understanding of where there has been a cyber 
element to a reported/recorded crime. The data also show 
(http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/09/5338/318201)  
͞Cƌiŵes of Fƌaud aĐĐouŶt foƌ ϱ% of Cƌiŵes of dishoŶestǇ. Oǀeƌ the teŶ Ǉeaƌ peƌiod fƌoŵ 
2005-06 to 2014-15, this category has fluctuated but overall has seen a decrease of 38%, and 
has decreased by 15% between 2013-14 and 2014-ϭϱ.͟ 
But this tells us nothing about the true situation of either fraud or cybercrimes generally there, upon 
which subject the reports remain silent. 
Germany 
According to the Police Crime Statistics (PCS) the average number of cybercrime offences for 
Germany is significantly smaller in the year 2014 than it was in previous years, whereas the clear-up 
rate increased in the same period. The German Federal Report (2015: 4) states that these result 
from changes in recording rules: Up until the end of 2013, the majority of the Länder (regions) 
recorded cybercrime offences as having caused damage in Germany (a computer harmed by 
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malware or a fraud victim based in Germany, for example) even if it was not known if the criminal 
act had been committed in Germany or abroad. In 2014, they would be recorded only where there 
are concrete indications that the criminal act was committed in Germany. Thus the drop in recorded 
computer crime from 88,722 in 2013 to 73,907 in 2014 does not represent a real fall.  Prior to these, 
the statistics for computer fraud did not show any major increases, but computer crime had done, 
but not extravagantly (from 62,944 in 2007). Recorded frauds that can be connected to cyber are 
rising, e.g. in 2014, the Bundeskriminalamt registered an increase of 70.5% in cases of Phishing 
directly related to online-banking (6,984 cases). 
The Netherlands 
A one-off Dutch study in 2011 (Domenic et al., 2013) showed that of those using auction sites, 3.4% 
were victimized by some version of auction fraud. Less than 1% of the respondents had been 
victimized by identity fraud on the Internet, but among that group, certain Internet practices, like 
participating in pay contact or dating sites, seem to contribute to the chances of being victimized 
through Internet identity fraud.8  A later Central Bureau of Statistics Netherlands general population 
study of identity fraud, consumer sales fraud and hacking by Kloosterman (2015) showed that 
hacking was the most common form of cybercrime in 2014, affecting more than 5 percent of the 
population, followed by acquisitions and sales fraud (3.5 percent) and identity theft (less than 1 
percent). Compared with 2012, there were fewer victims of hacking and identity theft, but more 
share telemarketing fraud victims. Online shopping fraud has increased from 2.7 percent in 2012 to 
3.3 percent in 2014, outstripping the rise in the percentage who shopped online. 5.8 percent of 
those who shopped online were victims of online shopping fraud, up from 5.3 percent in 2012.  
Rates of reporting to the police were low, the most common being for online shopping frauds, 
where a quarter reported to the police. The LISS panel data indicated that for identity fraud, 10% of 
the frauds were reported to the police, and they tended to be a selective group with a much higher 
than average financial loss. The Dutch Safety Monitor noted that in 2015, 11.1 percent of the Dutch 
population indicated they had been victims of one or more cybercrime offenses, ranging from 
identity theft and online shopping fraud to hacking and cyber bullying. 0.6 percent of the Dutch 
population fell victim of identity fraud, but some were repeat victims: one identity fraud incident 
occurred per 100 inhabitants.  In 2015, 3.5 percent of the Dutch population reported they had been 
scammed while buying or selling goods or services online: about the same as in 2014. There is little 
repeat victimization in cases involving sales or purchase scams. 
The cost of identity fraud in the Netherlands was estimated at 147-248 million euros in 2008-2009 
and between 134-228 million euros in 2010-2012, according to LISS panel results on victimization 
and financial harm. These numbers are based on questions posed to victims on the amount of 
money that was illegally withdrawn from their bank accounts (Paulissen and van Wilsem, 2015). 
                                                 
8 see also ǀaŶ Wilseŵ͛s ;ϮϬϭϯa, b) representative household panel, so more people per household are allowed 
to participate. It is smaller than the Domenic survey, but it is a longitudinal sample. Specific online behaviours 
predicted specific online victimization types (e.g., using social media predicted only harassment and not 
hacking). 
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Sweden 
The Swedish Crime Survey 2014 shows that the percentage of people exposed to fraud has gradually 
increased from 2.5 per cent in 2006 to 3.5 per cent in 2013 before falling to 3.1 percent in 2014, and 
44 percent of these involved the Internet. The only acquisitive crime more common than fraud in 
Sweden is bicycle theft.  84 percent of victims stated that this was a single event, but this still leaves 
1 in 6 fraud victims suffering multiple victimisation (some of them being presumably multiple card 
fraud victims). Median losses are under 10,000 Kroner (£817/$1,171). In terms of recorded fraud, 
compared with 2013, Computer Fraud increased by 25 percent to 42,900 reported crimes.  See 
further, https://www.bra.se/bra/brott-och-statistik/bedragerier-och-ekobrott.html.  The trend in 
recorded data may be seen below: 
 
Switzerland 
Like other jurisdictions, Switzerland has been experiencing a rise in reported e-Crimes, rising from 
6,181 offences in 2010 to 10,214 in 2014, with a rising proportion of those being property offences 
(Cybercrime Coordination Unit Switzerland, 2015).  The Swiss component of the International Crime 
Victimisation Survey showed a drop from 2010 to 2015 in the proportion who were victims of online 
shopping frauds, from 41.8 to 28.6%; and in payment card fraud, from 1% in 2009 to 0.4% in 2015 
(Biberstein et al., 2016). 
Australia 
The ABS (2016) national personal fraud survey revealed that in the 12 months prior to interview in 
2014-15, an estimated 1.6 million Australians experienced personal fraud, i.e. 8.5% of the population 
aged 15 and over, up from 6.7% in 2010-11.   Over two thirds (71%) who experienced personal fraud 
experienced a single incident. Three-quarters of persons who experienced personal fraud incurred a 
financial loss. The total estimated financial loss as a result of all personal fraud incidents was $3 
billion dollars. 
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The most common fraud type was card fraud, affecting 5.9% of the population aged 15 and over, 
compared with 3.7% in 2010-11. The total estimated financial loss to card fraud in 2014-15 was $2.1 
billion, double the losses in 2010-11. However, the financial loss after reimbursement (out of pocket 
loss) decreased between 2010-11 and 2014-15, from $208.9 million to $84.8 million, showing the 
importance of compensation rules and public pressure in allocating the distribution of losses 
between banks and the public.  
0.7% of the population aged 15 and over were victims of identity theft.  No fewer than 56% of the 
Australian population 15 or over was exposed to at least one type of scam, and of those exposed, 4% 
admitted responding (though this total of actual victims was lower than in 2010-11, showing the 
importance of crime reduction measures in reducing actual vulnerability). 
The United States 
The US has long been notorious for the inadequacy of its national recorded fraud statistics.  Thus 
while we have detailed data on bank robberies, there is no real white-collar crime count:  it is as if 
the nation was stuck in the Dillinger Days of the early1930s, when inter-state robberies were the 
primary risk. Nevertheless, a ďƌoadeƌ seaƌĐh shoǁs that the FBI͛s IŶteƌŶet Cƌiŵe CoŵplaiŶts CeŶteƌ 
(IC3) does collect centrally individual crime complaints for internet frauds, though for reasons that 
are hard to understand conceptually, these are not included in the Uniform Crime Reports or 
integrated in other crime counts. In 2015, the IC3 received 288,012 complaints (up from 269,422 the 
previous year) with an adjusted gross dollar loss of $1,070,711,522 (up from $800.5 m. in 2014); the 
average loss for those reporting loss was $8,421; and the median dollar loss was $560 (FBI, 2015, 
2016). The total losses therefore are substantial, but would not be a large proportion of the cost of 
white-collar and corporate crime generally, though the latter have not been precisely analysed. The 
peak year was 2011, when 314,246 complaints were received.  The IC3 estimates that fewer than 10 
percent of victims file directly through ww.ic3.gov, but the basis for this estimate is not disclosed. 
The unit contributed to the efforts of combating Internet crime by disseminating over 1,500 referrals 
to law enforcement agencies in 2014, of which many referral packages included multiple complaints.  
In 2015, the corresponding data were not provided.  But it provided 165 referrals to eight Cyber Task 
Forces, which opened 39 Operation Well Spring investigations involving some 3,650 individual 
complaints, with a total victim loss of approximately $55 million (FBI, 2016). As is common 
everywhere, at least in the public arena, there is no systematic follow up of what happens to those 
reports, and there is little insight into the subsequent case attrition (or disruption) process. 
What this amounts to is that fraud, particularly identity theft, has become the modal acquisitive 
crime by volume in the US (and in other advanced Western economies), as other property crimes 
have fallen, and that the percentage of people suffering (or aware of suffering) identity theft has 
risen over time. (See Tcherni et al., 2016 for a helpful discussion based largely on US data; and 
Harrell, 2015, for the most recent US identity theft survey, which shows inter alia that about 7% of 
persons 16 or older were victims of identity theft in 2014, similar to findings in 2012; and the 
number of ͚elderly͛ victims of identity theft increased from 2.1 million in 2012 to 2.6 million in 2014.)  
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Canada 
53 percent of Canadians have been the victims of financial fraud in their lifetimes (Leger, 2016). This 
includes 34% who have been victims of unauthorised payment card fraud, and a quarter 
experiencing phishing emails (defined as an attempt to acquire sensitive information such as 
usernames, passwords credit card details – personal communication with Leger).  12% have been 
victims of telephone scams, and 4% of identity theft.   
An Internet victimization survey in 2009 found that about 4% of Canadians who used the Internet in 
the previous 12 months reported being the victim of bank fraud on the Internet (Canada Statistics 
2011). People living in cities were twice as likely as others to report internet bank fraud. About 14% 
of Internet users who made online purchases in the 12 months preceding the survey encountered 
problems, most often not receiving goods or services that had already been paid for, receiving 
goods or services that were not as described on the website or having extra funds taken from their 
account. 
Two-thirds (65%) of Internet users reported that their computer had been previously infected by 
a virus, spyware or adware (although this does not mean that any economic harm resulted from 
this). Another 4 in 10 Internet users (39%) indicated that they had experienced at least one phishing 
attempt. Unfortunately, the Canadian government has not repeated these questions in its crime 
surveys.  Reyns & Henson (2016) report that 3% of Canadians were victims of identity theft in 2009, 
and that there was a significant relationship between online activity and victimization risk. They cite 
figures from Statistics Canada that in 2011, identity-related crimes occurred at rates of 11.5 (identity 
theft) and 22.9 (identity fraud) per 100,000 persons, respectively. 
The above countries are those where there has been some significant attempt at official 
measurement of victimisation beyond police-recorded crime data.  However, there are other 
important countries – some with high technological development – which have not done so, and 
some examples are set out below. 
Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong police was an early convert to the importance of cybercrime, and in 2014, it was 
made a priority for the police Cyber Security and Technology Crime Bureau.  The following tables 
show the rise in both the costs and numbers of reported crime.  The annual reports helpfully utilise a 
category of technology crimes, which have been rising substantially as other recorded crimes have 
been falling or static.   
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Number of cases and the financial losses due to reported computer crime in Hong Kong 
Year 
No. of 
Cases 
Financial Loss  
(HK$ million)    
2015 6862 1828.90 
2014 6778 1200.68 
2013 5133 916.90 
2012 3015 340.41 
2011 2206 148.52 
2010 1643 60.38 
2009 1506 45.10 
Source: Hong Kong Police Force - http://www.infosec.gov.hk/english/crime/statistics.html 
According to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, there are 11 million online banking accounts in the 
city, which generated 17 million transactions worth HK$7.3 trillion per month in 2015.   
The upwards trend in cases may also be seen in the other highly technologized countries of South 
Asia and South East Asia such as the Republic of Korea (where reported computer crimes have 
doubled since 2004); in Singapore, which has seen a trebling in reported cases of online cheating 
since 2013; and in India, where the number of cases registered by the police under the Information 
Technology Act grew by more than 50% in both 2012 & 2013 from 2011. The cases registered under 
the Indian Penal Code in 2013 more than doubled from 2012 (https://factly.in/cyber-crimes-in-india-
which-state-tops-the-chart/).  Given the rise in the use of technology for shopping and dating, the 
rise in the number of recorded cases is substantially less than the volume of transactions, and given 
that confidence in the police is so variable and/or unresearched in many countries, these data might 
be considered alongside the global surveys by such as McAfee Labs, Trend Micro, and PwC. 
Costs and Impact of Cyberfraud 
 
Public policy on cybercrimes often uses politically convenient data and/or data that have not been 
properly considered, and the appropriate metrics remain disputed (Graves et al., 2016; Jardine, 
2015).  Alternatively, one might consider frauds (and other crimes) as a ratio of routine activities, 
including internet shopping and mobile phone banking which has increase dramatically in the UK 
(BBA, 2016a) and elsewhere, even in developing countries.  A sub-set of those costs are those of 
cyberfrauds, whose costs are and should always remain an area of contested argument. Efforts at 
cost estimation will always be provisional, not least because the exploitation of vulnerabilities and 
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collateral damage may take years (if ever) to eŵeƌge:  the ͚tail͛ of Đosts from a data breach, for 
example, may depend on the organisation of crimes, the responses of victims and third parties, 
etcetera. The UK Home Office has embarked upon work on the costs of cyber crimes but data are 
not available at this stage. No study of the costs of cybercrime can be definitive, even as a snapshot 
iŶ tiŵe, let aloŶe as ͚data͛ to ďe used ďǇ politiĐiaŶs iŶ peƌpetuitǇ, as the widely disparaged Detica 
(2011) £27 billion ͚estimate͛ for the UK has been. It has become common for national cybercrime 
strategies to Đite otheƌ ĐouŶtƌies͛ ǁoƌk, only sometimes (as in the New Zealand 2015 one) with 
appropriate caveats of comparability. The spectrum is between a narrow summation of the known 
direct costs of detected crimes (perhaps even restricted to cases where a conviction has been 
obtained, because only then is criminality definitive), at one end, and speculative extrapolations 
from cases or sub-sets the dimensions of whose sets are unknown, at the other. In cyber, this is 
particularly complicated because it is a set of diverse acts representing mechanisms of crime 
commission, about which few organisations - whether victims or third parties like the police or 
vendors - compile data comprehensively or systematically. And unlike fraud (at least in the UK), 
relatively little systematic effort has gone into measuring the costs of any sub-ĐoŵpoŶeŶt of ͚the 
ĐǇďeƌ pƌoďleŵ͛.  
The emotional costs of actual cyber-related economic crimes and of the fear thereof have not been 
properly costed to date (Levi, 2009).  Some of that fear has been amplified by software sales firms 
and by public and private security agencies seeking more resources, but it would be too difficult to 
sepaƌate out these fƌoŵ ͚tƌue͛ Đosts.  Besides, eǀeŶ ŵaŶufaĐtuƌed feaƌs become real costs for 
citizens, whether private individuals or businesspeople.  (We should also acknowledge the paradox 
that many who become victims are not fearful enough, or anyway that their fears are ill-directed 
towards mistaken problems and solutions.)  
For each of the main categories of cybercrime, Anderson et al. (2012) set out what is and is not 
known of the direct costs, indirect costs and defence costs – both to the UK and to the world as a 
whole, since the attribution of costs to particular countries is especially difficult in cyber. With global 
estimates, some fairly crude scaling based on GDP or in some cases, volumes of internet trade, have 
to be done to estimate costs to particular countries. Since the means (e. g., botnets) would not be 
around if there were not ends (e. g., phishing victims), we consider losses caused by the 
cybercriminal infrastructure as indirect by nature; irrespective of whether or not the legal 
framework formally criminalizes the means. Anderson et al. were more cautious than many others 
about the costs of IP espionage, since so little is known about both losses and whether external 
cyber-attacks or (as we suspect) internal corruption/protest/ disloyalty – depeŶdiŶg oŶ oŶe͛s 
ideological position as well as on the evidence- are the primary cause of those that we do know 
about. 
We distiŶguished ĐaƌefullǇ ďetǁeeŶ tƌaditioŶal Đƌiŵes that aƌe Ŷoǁ ͚ĐǇďeƌ͛ ďeĐause theǇ aƌe 
conducted online (such as tax and welfare fraud); transitional crimes whose modus operandi has 
changed substantially as a result of the move online (such as credit card fraud); new crimes that owe 
their existence to the Internet; and what we might call platform crimes such as the provision of 
botnets which facilitate other crimes rather than being used to extract money from victims directly. 
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As far as direct costs are concerned, we found that traditional offences such as tax and welfare fraud 
cost the typical citizen in the low hundreds of pounds/ Euros/ dollars a year; transitional frauds cost 
a few pounds/Euros/dollars; while the new computer crimes cost in the tens of pence/cents. In 
some cases, low production and distribution costs to criminals mean that direct social losses are 
roughly similar to criminal profits. For instance, UK consumers provided roughly $400,000 to the top 
counterfeit pharmaceutical programs in 2010 and perhaps as much as $1.2M per-month overall. UK-
originated criminal revenue is no more than $14m a year, and global revenue, $288m. The five top 
software counterfeiting organisations have an annual turnover of around $22m worldwide. 
However, the indirect costs and defence costs are much higher for transitional and new crimes. For 
the former they may be roughly comparable to what the criminals earn, while for the latter they 
may be an order of magnitude more. As a striking example, the botnet behind a third of the spam 
sent in 2010 earned its owners around US$2.7m, while worldwide expenditures on spam prevention 
probably exceeded a billion dollars. Such defence expenditure is not necessarily irrational, but where 
crime is concentrated among a relatively small number of offenders who are hard to replace, it 
makes sense to use criminal justice mechanisms to incapacitate the offenders. For example, the 
number of phishing websites, of distinct attackers and of different types of malware is persistently 
over-reported, leading some police forces to believe that the problem is too large and diffuse for 
them to tackle, when in fact a small number of gangs lie behind many incidents and a police 
response against them could be far more effective than telling the public to fit anti-phishing toolbars 
or to purchase antivirus software (though this might also be desirable). This is part of a much wider 
problem of attributing risks to patterns of offending.   
Table 1 sets out the conclusions of Anderson et al. (2012) about the costs of different forms of 
cyber-related crimes, based on evidence available to us at the time and on the organisation of those 
crimes and cyber-defences as they then existed.  (See Riek et al., 2016 for work on indirect impacts.) 
As we might expect from routine activities theory, these are inherently dynamic, and even if the 
conclusions we came to then were valid, those costs both of crime and of prevention/responses to 
crime will have changed substantially in the intervening five years and projected onwards to the 
future. It is uŶdeƌstaŶdaďle ďut ƌegƌettaďle that Đost data teŶd to ďe used ǁell past theiƌ ͚ďest 
before͛ date.  Note also that even when attempts are unsuccessful, the immense costs to banks and 
other parties of protecting themselves and/or getting third parties to do so need to be factored in, 
and it is difficult to work out what optimal defence expenditure (or conversely, irrational 
expenditure) looks like in the context of almost constant attacks by private, state-tolerated and 
state-sponsored attackers.   
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Table 1: Judgement on coverage of cost categories by known estimates.  
 
Estimating  costs and scaling: Figures in boldface are estimates based on data or assumption for the reference 
area. Unless both figures in a row are bold, the non-boldfaĐe figuƌe has ďeeŶ sĐaled usiŶg the UK’s shaƌe of 
world GDP unless otherwise stated in the main text. Extrapolations from UK numbers to the global scale should 
be interpreted with utmost caution. A threshold to enter this table is defined at $10m for the global estimate.  
LegeŶd: × : iŶĐluded, ;×Ϳ : paƌtly Đoǀeƌed; ǁith Ƌualifieƌs ×↑ foƌ likely oǀeƌ-estimated,  
×↓ foƌ likely uŶdeƌestiŵated, aŶd ×?  for high uncertainty. 
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Conclusions 
The articles in this volume deal with different dimensions of cyber-enabled crime and issues 
concerning the focus and the effectiveness of law enforcement responses.  The activities against 
which they can be measured are reasonably knowable from public sources and sometimes even 
published. However for others, including the broader issues examined by Levi et al. in this volume, 
the error margins in the data (if there are any data at all) are often too great to know whether ͚the 
pƌoďleŵ;sͿ͛ is getting better or worse.  The relationship between levels of crime and anxiety about 
crime is a further important dimension that has been studied more offline than online, and more for 
individuals than for businesspeople.  Perfect knowledge is implausible in fraud, as there will always 
be interpretation tensions and victim/bystander ignorance of deception:  but we can and should do 
better in raising our understanding, not just because social harm statistics are good in themselves 
but also because of the need to assess the performance of crime reduction and criminal justice 
efforts.  The national security aspects of cyber-risk are more tortuous and even harder to evaluate, 
but cybersecurity is in the highest category aŶd that soŵeǁhat opaƋue ĐoŶstƌuĐt ͚tƌaŶsŶatioŶal 
oƌgaŶised Đƌiŵe͛ is iŶ the seĐoŶd highest ĐategoƌǇ iŶ seǀeƌal ŶatioŶal ƌisk assessŵeŶts (see Europol, 
2016; NCA, 2016).  As to the linkage between these and economic cybercrimes, it should be noted 
that there is not a sharp division between these larger national security issues and cyber attacks (for 
fraud and intellectual property theft) on banks, businesses, and the spear phishing of individuals 
with important knowledge of system vulnerabilities in the public or the private sector.  Rather there 
is a punctuated continuum in the interplay between private, corporate governmental and wider 
social risks.  
The measurement of direct and indirect intellectual property losses and even of fraud has been the 
subject of much dispute.  The problems of attribution to nation-state actors take us beyond the tasks 
addressed in this volume, but it is mentioned here because as Sparrow (2008) argues, it makes a 
diffeƌeŶĐe to ouƌ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of haƌŵ aŶd thƌeat ǁhetheƌ people aƌe ͚ĐoŶsĐious oppoŶeŶts͛ aŶd, ďǇ 
extension, what sort of conscious opponents they are.  We may need to clarify conceptually the 
terminology that we apply to this field, a clarity that is needed in dealing with that amorphous mess 
of polycriminal enterprises involved in the organisation of serious crimes (van Duyne and van Dijck, 
2007; von Lampe, 2016; Levi, 2012).   
Finally, we might reconsider some of the overlaps that exist between online and offline crimes, and 
think through the ways in which online is transformative either for levels and organisation of crime 
commission or for the balance between disruption (another ambiguous term) and the traditional 
detection, investigation and prosecution processes that constitute a criminal justice response. In 
doing so, we should not ignore the fact that even when economic crimes were mostly or (40 years 
ago) entirely offline, we knew very little about their cost, incidence and prevalence, or about how 
effective were the modest control efforts we made to combat some of them.  Nor should we think 
that anxiety about fraud is merely a feature of the rise of the Internet:  the Metropolitan and City of 
London police fraud squad was formed as a response to the risks of fraud facing those demobilised 
after the Second World War, and early crime surveys showed substantial anxieties about identity 
theft and card theft even before data breach and hacking scandals reached their recent levels (Levi, 
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2009).  Measuring the impact of ICT on volume frauds is valuable; and countries that are serious 
about evaluating the risks that face their citizens, denizens, businesses and governments need to 
upgrade their statistical efforts. However these should not be mistaken for measures of the 
influence of ICT on management frauds or on more general corporate crime.  Whatever data we are 
using, our societies and law enforcement agencies need to face up to significant challenges in how to 
respond to the flood of cases about which – even in the comparatively well-resourced US – very little 
reactive enforcement follow up normally happens.  This includes responding to the crimes, 
promoting cyberfraud prevention and resilience, and more general ͚ƌeassuƌaŶĐe poliĐiŶg͛.    
In reviewing some trends in some countries, we cannot escape the difficulties in enhancing our 
awareness aŶd gettiŶg a ͚tƌueƌ͛ piĐtuƌe of ͚what happened͛ in cyberfrauds – from the perspectives of 
victims, third parties, or law enforcement. The aim has been analogous to that of Becker (1974) in 
his needlessly apologetic comments in his reconsideration of labelling theory: ͞a peƌspeĐtiǀe ǁhose 
value will appear, if at all, in increased understanding of things formerly obscure͟.  If this article and 
others in this volume succeed in rendering some features of cybercrimes for gain less obscure, then 
we will have met our objective, even if the problems of actually doing something to reduce those 
harms – by law enforcement or by other public and private security actors - remain quite intractable. 
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